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Are Empowerment and Education
Enough? Underdiversiﬁcation 
in 401(k) Plans
AT THE END of 2000, current and former employees of the energy trading
company Enron Corporation held $2.1 billion in the ﬁrm’s 401(k) retire-
ment savings plan. Sixty-two percent of that money was invested in Enron
stock, then trading at $83 a share. In October 2001 Enron’s ﬁnances began
to unravel as its accounting improprieties came to light. Enron stock plum-
meted over the next several weeks, and on December 2, 2001, the com-
pany declared bankruptcy, rendering its shares worthless. Thousands of
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National Bureau of Economic Research.Although the Enron 401(k) debacle was highly publicized, Enron was
neither the first nor the last company whose collapse decimated its work-
ers’ 401(k) accounts. Over the past few years a similar fate has befallen
employees of WorldCom, Global Crossing, Polaroid, Kmart, Lucent, and
Providian, among others. In response, many bills have been proposed in
Congress that would regulate employer stock holdings within 401(k)
plans. Compared with existing law on deﬁned-beneﬁt pension plans, which
strictly prohibits plans from holding more than 10 percent of their assets in
employer securities, most of the bills proposed for regulating defined-
contribution plans appear mild. Common themes in these proposals are
empowerment and education rather than prohibition: give employees the
right to sell the employer stock in their 401(k), and inform them about
the risks of not doing so.
For example, one of only two bills that have so far come up for a vote
in either house of Congress, the Pension Security Act (see table A-1 in the
appendix), has two key provisions relating to employer stock. First, it
would prohibit employers from requiring employees to invest their own
401(k) contributions in employer stock. Second, it would require that
employers allow plan participants to diversify any matching funds con-
tributed by the employer three years after receiving that match. Other
proposed legislation would require that plan participants be notified if
the fraction of their assets invested in employer stock exceeds a certain
threshold (such as 20 percent), that companies offer a certain number of
alternatives to employer stock if it is made an investment option, or that
companies educate plan participants about the risks of not diversifying
their assets.
This paper assesses how effective the “empower and educate” regula-
tory approach might be at reducing 401(k) employer stock holdings. We
begin by studying ﬁve natural experiments in which employees experi-
enced a discrete change in the restrictions on employer stock holdings. In
these examples the restrictions changed for one of two reasons: either
employees crossed an age or tenure threshold above which they were
allowed to diversify their holdings, or the company changed its rules to
enable all employees to diversify their investments. We ﬁnd only a modest
employee response to either type of change. Merely allowing diversifica-
tion does not cause it to happen.
We then consider whether educational efforts might motivate employees
to diversify out of employer stock. Although many studies have concluded
152 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005that ﬁnancial education does affect employees’ choices, the subset of stud-
ies that randomly assign education and measure subsequent actions have
found small effects.
1 These studies still leave open the possibility that
other kinds of education might yield larger behavioral changes.
Here we evaluate a different form of education: witnessing the real-
life experience of others. Economists since Armen Alchian in the 1950s
have argued that the imitation of successful strategies (and, conversely,
the avoidance of unsuccessful strategies) is an important force pushing
economic actors toward optimal behavior.
2 We test this hypothesis in the
context of the media coverage surrounding the Enron, WorldCom, and
Global Crossing bankruptcies. Speciﬁcally, we investigate how much work-
ers at other companies reduced their employer stock holdings in response
to the blizzard of media stories early in this decade illustrating the dan-
gers of putting all of one’s retirement savings in employer stock.
We chose Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossing because a large per-
centage of their employees’ 401(k) assets was held in employer stock, and
because their bankruptcies, the associated accounting scandals, and their
decimated 401(k) plans received so much attention from so many media
outlets. For example, the New York Times ran 1,364 stories mentioning
Enron during the last quarter of 2001 and the ﬁrst quarter of 2002, of which
112 ran on the front page.
We ﬁnd that this media barrage had a surprisingly modest impact on
employer stock holdings in other 401(k) plans, reducing the fraction of
assets held in employer stock by no more than 2 percentage points from an
initial 36 percent of balances. We present evidence that this small reaction
is not due to restrictions on diversiﬁcation. In addition, we show that
workers in Texas, who were likely to have been disproportionately
exposed to Enron-related news, did not reduce their investment in employer
stock any more than did workers outside of Texas. Even in Houston—
Enron’s headquarters—where the Houston Chronicle ran 1,122 stories
mentioning Enron in the six months surrounding the firm’s collapse,
employees did not show evidence of learning the lesson of Enron.
This paper raises broader questions about retirement savings policy. It
adds to the convergent body of evidence that many employees do not
make optimal ﬁnancial decisions. Households typically behave passively,
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2. Alchian (1950).following the path of least resistance. Such inertia often translates into
household acceptance of the investment choices made automatically by
their company on their behalf, even when those default choices are sub-
optimal for them.
3 For example, many ﬁrms automatically allocate 401(k)
matching funds to employer stock, where the money typically stays even if
employees are permitted to subsequently rebalance their portfolio.
Two policy solutions present themselves. First, society could give ﬁrms
incentives to adopt socially optimal default choices.
4 However, it is not
always obvious what such optimal defaults would be. Moreover, one default
is rarely right for every employee, since employees face different econo-
mic circumstances. Alternatively, society could adopt default-free systems,
which do not confer an advantage on one choice over another, by forcing
employees to explicitly state their preference.
5 However, default-free sys-
tems will work only if employees are likely to make good decisions when
forced to do so.
We begin with a brief summary of the current regulation of employer
stock in 401(k) plans. We then summarize previous research on employer
stockholding in 401(k) plans and how 401(k) outcomes are affected by plan
features. Next we describe the employee-level 401(k) data we have for the
seven companies examined in our analysis. Our empirical analysis begins
with the results from ﬁve natural experiments on relaxing diversiﬁcation
restrictions. We then turn to examining the impact of the Enron, WorldCom,
and Global Crossing crises on employer stock holdings for a large sample
of employees at other ﬁrms. We conclude by discussing alternative legisla-
tive approaches that are likely to decrease employer stock holdings substan-
tially, and implications for savings policies more generally.
Regulation of Employer Stockholding in 401(k) Plans
Like deﬁned-beneﬁt pension plans, 401(k) plans are primarily regulated
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).
6
Under ERISA, plan fiduciaries have four responsibilities: to act for the
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6. This section draws heavily on Ng (2003) and Reish and Faucher (2002).exclusive beneﬁt of plan participants and their beneﬁciaries (the “exclu-
sive purpose rule”); to act with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence that
a prudent person acting in a similar capacity would use (the “prudent man
rule”); to diversify plan assets across different types of investments, geo-
graphic areas, industrial sectors, and dates of maturity so as to reduce the
chance of large losses (the “diversiﬁcation rule”); and to act in accordance
with plan documents.
At the time ERISA was passed, deﬁned-beneﬁt pension plans were the
primary employer-sponsored mechanism for providing income to persons
in retirement. To help safeguard the assets of these plans, ERISA explicitly
caps the holdings of employer stock at 10 percent of total assets. Deﬁned-
contribution plans, however, face no such limit. The most common type
of deﬁned-contribution plan today, the 401(k) plan, did not exist when
ERISA was enacted. Those deﬁned-contribution plans that did exist con-
sisted mainly of proﬁt-sharing plans, to which employers made variable
contributions based on company earnings, and employee stock ownership
plans (ESOPs), which were explicitly designed to encourage ownership
of employer stock. ERISA exempts these plans from the diversification
requirements for employer securities.
When 401(k) plans were ﬁrst authorized, in 1978, it was not anticipated
that they would supplant defined-benefit pension plans as the primary
source of employee retirement income. Hence Congress did not extend the
10 percent limit on employer stock holdings to 401(k) plans. Employers
thus have much latitude in determining how much employer stock employ-
ees may hold in their 401(k).
A common way of holding employer stock in a 401(k) is through an
ESOP. This combination of a 401(k) and an ESOP is sometimes referred
to as a KSOP. Many companies, however, offer employer stock in their
401(k) plan without an ESOP, and many companies also operate an ESOP
that is separate from the 401(k) plan. A KSOP is a savings plan intended
to benefit employees, but it is also a corporate finance mechanism that
encourages employee ownership. The KSOP’s dual purposes can create a
conflict of interest between plan beneficiaries and the employer. As a
result, employer stock regulations for 401(k) plans with an ESOP differ
from those for plans without one.
A 401(k) plan without an ESOP may not require that more than 10 per-
cent of the employee’s own contributions be held in employer stock. This
requirement does not hold for a KSOP. Neither plan, with or without an
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that may be directed into employer stock. All assets within an ESOP, how-
ever, are subject to a set of explicit diversiﬁcation requirements. Employ-
ees with ten years of tenure must be allowed to diversify 25 percent of their
employer stock holdings once they reach age ﬁfty-ﬁve, and 50 percent
once they reach age sixty. (These diversiﬁcation requirements do not apply
to employer stock holdings outside of an ESOP.) Companies can and do,
however, adopt diversiﬁcation policies that are more generous than those
mandated by ERISA. Finally, should a lawsuit arise, the ﬁduciary stan-
dards of prudence and exclusive purpose against which the company’s
behavior is judged are lower for a KSOP than for a 401(k) plan without an
ESOP, because of the dual purposes of the former.
7
Previous Research on Employer Stock in 401(k) Plans
Olivia Mitchell and Stephen Utkus report that, averaging across all
401(k) plans—including those without employer stock as an investment
option—19 percent of plan assets are held in employer stock.
8 This statis-
tic understates the diversiﬁcation problem, since most participants do not
have employer stock as an investment option—their employers do not
offer it or are not publicly held ﬁrms. Only about 10 percent of companies
offer employer stock in their 401(k) investment menu. Because these com-
panies tend to be larger ﬁrms, 35 percent of all 401(k) participants are in
plans that do include employer stock as an option.
9 These employees often
have 401(k) portfolios that are heavily concentrated in employer stock.
William Even and David Macpherson calculate that 50 percent of assets in
plans offering employer stock were held in employer stock in 1998.
10
Plans offering employer stock can be further divided into those in which
the employee must choose an investment allocation for the employer
match and those in which the employer match is directed into employer
stock by default. In 2001 two-thirds of those plans directing the match into
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(2002).
9. Even and Macpherson (2004).
10. Even and Macpherson (2004).employer stock allowed participants to immediately trade out of employer
stock, whereas the rest imposed a holding requirement.
11 Sarah Holden and
Jack VanDerhei report that, in plans that offer employer stock as an invest-
ment option but do not direct the match into employer stock, 22 percent of
assets are held in employer stock; in plans in which the employer match is
directed into employer stock, a much larger fraction of assets, 53 percent,
is held in employer stock.
12
The Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossing bankruptcies highlighted
two major risks associated with concentrated investments in employer
stock. First, investing in any single security is riskier than investing in a
diversiﬁed portfolio such as a mutual fund. Several studies have estimated
that, on a risk-adjusted basis, a single-stock portfolio is worth less than half
the equivalent amount invested in a diversiﬁed portfolio.
13 Second, the
value of employer stock may be positively correlated with employees’
labor income; as noted at the outset, many Enron employees simultane-
ously lost their jobs and their retirement savings.
Shlomo Benartzi and coauthors identify some benefits to employees
from holding employer stock in their 401(k) plan, but they note that these
benefits are small relative to the substantial costs of nondiversification.
14
Why then do employees invest so much of their 401(k) portfolios in
employer stock? A number of psychological factors may be important.
Employees may underestimate the risk of employer stock because of
“familiarity bias.” The John Hancock Financial Services Deﬁned Contri-
bution Plan Survey ﬁnds that participants on average rate employer stock
as less risky than an equity mutual fund.
15 Similarly, Benartzi and others
ﬁnd that only 33 percent of participants believe that their employer stock
is riskier than a diversiﬁed stock fund, whereas 39 percent believe it is
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13. Poterba (2003); Meulbroek (2005); Brennan and Torous (1999).
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15. John Hancock Financial Services (2002). Interestingly, the perceived risk of em-
ployer stock in the John Hancock survey has not changed much over time, even following
the Enron scandal.equally risky and 25 percent believe it is safer. Furthermore, 20 percent of
respondents said they would prefer $1,000 in employer stock that they
could not diversify until age ﬁfty over $1,000 that they could invest at their
own discretion.
16
Lauren Cohen argues that loyalty to one’s employer motivates workers
to hold employer stock.
17 He finds that the share of employer stock held
in 401(k) plans by employees of standalone ﬁrms is 10 percentage points
greater than that of employees of conglomerates. Furthermore, when a
division is spun off from a conglomerate, the average employee’s holding
of employer stock increases, whereas it decreases following a merger.
Cohen ﬁnds no evidence that employees have superior information about
future employer stock returns.
Benartzi, Choi and others, and Gail Huberman and Paul Sengmueller
find that current contributions to employer stock are increasing in the
stock’s past returns.
18 If employees think past returns predict future re-
turns, then the high volatility of employer stock relative to mutual funds
and the inability to sell securities short in a 401(k) will jointly lead to over-
weighting of employer stock in the average 401(k) portfolio. Intuitively,
employer stock is likely to be in either the upper or the lower tail of the
401(k) asset return distribution in any given period. Upper-tail outcomes
have a greater impact on asset allocation than lower-tail outcomes because
of the constraint on short sales. Like Cohen, Benartzi ﬁnds no correlation
between employee allocations to employer stock and the stock’s subsequent
returns.
Benartzi and Richard Thaler suggest that naïve strategies for diversify-
ing across investment options cause many investors to allocate part of
their contributions to employer stock simply because it is available in the
401(k) menu.
19 Nellie Liang and Scott Weisbenner report evidence con-
sistent with this hypothesis speciﬁcally for employer stock.
20 Employees
may also perceive the presence of employer stock in the 401(k) fund
menu as an endorsement of the stock by the employer. Benartzi, Holden,
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20. Liang and Weisbenner (2002).and VanDerhei, and Jeffrey Brown, Liang, and Weisbenner, ﬁnd that dis-
cretionary contributions to employer stock are higher in ﬁrms where the
employer directs matching contributions into employer stock than in ﬁrms
where employer stock is simply available as another investment option.
21
These investment menu effects are consistent with a growing body of
literature that ﬁnds that 401(k) savings outcomes are strongly affected by
the features of the plan, even when those features do not explicitly restrict
employee choices. Madrian and Dennis Shea, as well as Choi and coau-
thors, document the tendency of participants to passively accept 401(k)
enrollment, contribution, and investment fund defaults.
22 Switching from
an opt-in to an opt-out enrollment mechanism raises 401(k) participa-
tion rates six months after hire by over 50 percentage points at some
ﬁrms. The vast majority (65 to 87 percent) of newly hired employees
retain the automatic enrollment default contribution rate and asset alloca-
tion upon enrollment in the 401(k) plan. Although the fraction of employ-
ees at the default declines over time, the inertia is very strong: three years
after hire, nearly half of participants are still at the defaults. Generalizing
from these results, one might expect that employer matching contribu-
tions made in employer stock will stay in employer stock, even if partici-
pants are able to immediately diversify out.
Choi and others show that requiring employees to explicitly choose
within a month of hire whether or not to participate in a 401(k) plan (thus
removing the option of passively accepting a default outcome) raises the
initial participation rate by 28 percentage points, and the average contribu-
tion rate by 1.2 percentage points, relative to a standard opt-in enrollment
procedure.
23 Such an “active decision” mechanism may also be an effec-
tive way of encouraging employees to diversify their assets. Employees
could be told to make an explicit asset allocation choice for their employer
matching funds, instead of the current system in which employers may
direct matching funds into employer stock by default.
24
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here.Employee-Level Data on 401(k) Participation
The employee-level data that we use to examine the holding of
employer stock in 401(k) plans come from Hewitt Associates, a large ben-
eﬁts administration and consulting ﬁrm. We use two different types of
administrative data. The ﬁrst is a series of repeated year-end cross sections
containing all persons employed at the company at the time of the data
snapshot. These cross sections include demographic information such as
birth date, hire date, and compensation. They also include information on
the worker’s 401(k) participation at the time of the cross section, such as
date of ﬁrst participation, total balances in the plan, and allocation of assets
among the available funds. The second type of data we have is a history of
every transaction made in the plan since Hewitt assumed its administra-
tion. These longitudinal data are available for two of the companies ana-
lyzed in this paper (companies D and F).
25 For all of these ﬁrms, our analysis
is restricted to active employees. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the demographic
and 401(k) plan characteristics of the seven ﬁrms studied in this paper.
Empowerment: The Effect of Relaxing 
Diversiﬁcation Restrictions
As already noted, current 401(k) regulations allow companies to
severely restrict their employees’ diversification out of employer stock.
Eighteen of the twenty-one congressional proposals in appendix table A-1
to reform 401(k) employer stock regulations would relax these restrictions,
permitting employees to trade out of employer stock in their 401(k) sooner.
To assess whether relaxing holding requirements would significantly
reduce employer stock holdings, we study two types of natural experi-
ments at five companies, all of which direct the employer match into
employer stock. The ﬁrst type results from changes in the diversiﬁcation
restrictions that employees face either as they age or as they increase their
tenure at the company. We examine how much employees divest them-
selves of employer stock when they clear the applicable age or tenure hur-
dles. The second type of natural experiment arises from company-wide
160 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































yrule changes that eliminate or relax holding requirements for all employ-
ees. We measure how much employer stock holdings fall after such re-
gime shifts.
Allowing Older Employees to Diversify out of Employer Stock
We begin with the firm we designate as company D, whose 401(k)
employer stock is in an ESOP and thus subject to the ESOP diversiﬁcation
rules described above (for employees with ten years of tenure, 25 percent
diversiﬁcation is allowed at age ﬁfty-ﬁve, and 50 percent at age sixty). The
middle right panel in ﬁgure 1 shows the effect on employee portfolios of
crossing these age and tenure thresholds. It compares the actual average
fraction of employer matching balances held by individual participants of a
given age in employer stock, as well as the actual dollar-weighted average
fraction (that is, total employer stock balances divided by total balances for
all employees of a given age), with the fraction that employees with at least
ten years of tenure would hold if they all diversiﬁed the maximum amount
allowed. The ﬁgure shows that actual diversiﬁcation is minimal. Across all
ages, the average participant holds at least 90 percent of match balances in
employer stock, even as the maximum diversiﬁcation allowed increases to
50 percent. There is no consistent divergence between the dollar-weighted
and the unweighted series, suggesting that wealthier employees are not
more likely to divest than poorer employees. This absence of a wealth
gradient in diversification holds for many of the companies we study in
this paper.
As previously noted, some companies have employer stock diversiﬁca-
tion policies that are less restrictive than what is legally required.
26 One of
these is company A, which also has an ESOP within its 401(k) plan.
Although this firm is subject to the same ESOP diversification require-
ments as company D, it voluntarily adopted less stringent diversiﬁcation
rules in 2002, allowing employees to diversify up to 25 percent of the
employer stock in their match account at age forty-five, 50 percent at
age fifty, and 100 percent at age fifty-five.
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Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Hewitt Associates.
a. Data for all companies are as of the end of the indicated year.
b. The sample is restricted to employees with at least ten years of tenure.  
c. The sample is restricted to employees with at least five years of tenure.
d.Aggregate employer stock balances in employer match accounts divided by aggregate employer match account balances.
e.Share consistent with maximum possible diversification allowed under company policy. Company E had no restrictions at the  







Figure 1. Shares of Employer Match 401(k) Balances Held in Employer Stock at Five
Companies, by Employee Age
a
James J. Choi, David Laibson and Brigitte C. Madrian 165The top left panel of figure 1 plots the relationship at company A
between age and the fraction of match balances in employer stock at the
end of 2003, approximately eighteen months after diversification restric-
tions were relaxed. Among employees between the ages of forty-five
and fifty, the average (non-dollar-weighted) fraction held in employer
stock fell by 7 percentage points. This is less than a third of the diversi-
fication available to these employees. Among employees at age ﬁfty-ﬁve,
employer stock holdings fell further, to 85 percent of total match bal-
ances, also about one-third of the actual diversification available. Among
employees at age ﬁfty-six, the fraction of match balances held in employer
stock fell to 76 percent, about one-quarter of the actual available diver-
sification, and the proportion does not drop below 64 percent through
age sixty-ﬁve. In this company, dollar-weighted averages fell slightly more,
indicating that richer employees are more eager to divest themselves of
employer stock, but even the dollar-weighted share is far from the maxi-
mum allowed diversiﬁcation.
Two other companies that have age- or tenure-based diversiﬁcation
rules—companies B and C—have life cycle diversiﬁcation patterns similar
to those of company A. Company B allows participants with at least ten
years of service to diversify 25 percent of their match balance holdings
starting at age fifty, 50 percent starting at age fifty-five, and 75 percent
starting at age sixty. The top right panel of ﬁgure 1 shows the fraction of
employer match balances held in employer stock at company B at the end
of 2003 for employees with at least ten years at the company. The simple
average seldom dips below 90 percent for workers between ﬁfty and sixty-
ﬁve years of age. Dollar-weighting the averages yields similar results.
Company C has more complicated diversiﬁcation rules. Employees
younger than fifty-five can diversify up to 50 percent of the employer
stock balances in their match accounts if they have ten years of plan par-
ticipation. Employees aged ﬁfty-ﬁve to ﬁfty-nine can also diversify up to
50 percent but need have only ﬁve years of plan participation to do so.
Employees between the ages of 60 and 701⁄2 can diversify 100 percent of
their employer stock balances if they have ﬁve years of plan participation.
Finally, employees over age 701⁄2 can sell all their employer stock regard-
less of their time in the plan.
Figure 2 plots average employer stock holdings in match balances at
company C at the end of 2002 against tenure in the plan for employees less
than ﬁfty-ﬁve years of age. The middle left panel in ﬁgure 1 plots average
166 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005holdings against age for employees at the same company who are between
ﬁfty-ﬁve and seventy and have at least ﬁve years of tenure in the plan. It is
apparent that, despite greatly relaxed holding constraints, most employees
at this company continued to hold more than 90 percent of their match bal-
ances in employer stock years after they became eligible to diversify.
Rule Changes That Relax Diversiﬁcation Restrictions for 
All Employees
Figures 1 and 2 suggest that allowing employees to diversify their
401(k) holdings has only a modest impact on actual diversiﬁcation. How-
ever, the complexity of the diversiﬁcation eligibility schedules may have
confused employees, reducing diversiﬁcation. Companies that completely
eliminate diversification restrictions for all employees may see greater
divestiture of employer stock. Here we study two companies that imple-
mented such a change.
The ﬁrst, company D, adhered to the standard ESOP diversiﬁcation
requirements (with the results analyzed in ﬁgure 1) until early 2002, when it
eliminated all diversiﬁcation restrictions. The company’s match, however,
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Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Hewitt Associates.
a. Includes only employees aged ﬁfty-ﬁve and older.
b. Aggregate employer stock balances in employer match accounts divided by aggregate employer match account balances.
c. Share consistent with maximum possible diversiﬁcation allowed under company policy: participants under age ﬁfty-ﬁve at
this company are allowed to diversify 50 percent of their employer stock holdings after ten years of plan participation.
Figure 2. Shares of Employer Match 401(k) Balances Held in Employer Stock 
at Company C, by Employee Tenure, December 31, 2002
acontinued to be directed to employer stock following this plan change.
Employees who wanted to maintain a portfolio free of employer stock
had to initiate trades on an ongoing basis as new matching contributions
were made.
Figure 3 shows the fraction of the employer match account held in
employer stock at company D from January 1998 through November
2003. Before the plan change, almost all employer match balances stayed
in employer stock. This is not surprising, given that only 6.6 percent of
employees met the standard ESOP age and tenure requirements for any
diversification. After the 2002 rule change, the allocation to employer
stock fell, but very slowly. At the end of 2003, almost two years after the
diversiﬁcation restrictions were lifted, 84 percent of match balances were
still in employer stock.
Company E eliminated all diversification restrictions in mid-2002. It,
too, continued to direct employer match contributions to employer stock.
Unfortunately, lack of appropriate data prevents us from producing the
analogue of figure 3 for company E. Instead the bottom left panel of 
figure 1 shows diversification by age at the end of 2003, approximately
eighteen months after the diversification restrictions were lifted. At this














Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Hewitt Associates.
a. Aggregate employer stock balances in employer match accounts divided by aggregate employer match account balances.
b. Company adhered to the standard ESOP diversiﬁcation requirements (see ﬁgure 1) until February 2002, when it eliminated 
all restrictions on employer stock diversiﬁcation.
Figure 3. Shares of Employer Match 401(k) Balances Held in Employer Stock 
at Company D before and after Diversiﬁcation Restrictions Were Liftedtime the average participant under age ﬁfty still had 90 percent of his or her
employer match balances in employer stock, and older employees contin-
ued to hold over 80 percent of their match balances in employer stock.
There is more diversiﬁcation on a dollar-weighted basis, especially among
older participants.
The five case studies presented here paint a consistent picture: relax-
ing diversiﬁcation requirements decreases employer stockholding, but the
magnitude of that reduction is modest, especially for younger employees.
Education: The Effect of Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossing
If giving employees the ability to diversify does not prompt them to
do so, perhaps educating them on the perils of underdiversification will
spur them to action. Six of the twenty-one proposed bills listed in appen-
dix table A-1 include an educational provision. The studies reviewed in
the introduction found that ﬁnancial education alone generates only small
changes in 401(k) outcomes. However, no one to our knowledge has for-
mally studied the effect on plan participants of witnessing the consequences
of others’ ﬁnancial follies.
Here we examine whether the media coverage of the plight of employ-
ees at Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossing—three companies fre-
quently mentioned together in news stories on the perils of holding too
much employer stock in one’s 401(k) account—caused employees at other
companies to reduce their employer stock holdings. On December 31,
2000, before any of these ﬁrms entered serious ﬁnancial distress, 62, 32,
and 29 percent of 401(k) assets were held in employer stock at Enron,
WorldCom, and Global Crossing, respectively, according to the compa-
nies’ Form 5500 filings and their 11-K filings with the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Figure 4 gives a timeline of the key events leading
up to the demise of these companies. For the purposes of our analysis, the
first “Enron event” was the $1.2 billion reduction in Enron shareholder
equity that occurred on October 16, 2001.
We construct a series of variables to capture the amount of media
coverage surrounding the ﬁnancial collapses of Enron, WorldCom, and
Global Crossing. These variables are based on the number of news stories
mentioning the three companies published each day starting on October 16,
2001. We employ four different counts. The ﬁrst is the number of stories
James J. Choi, David Laibson, and Brigitte C. Madrian 169published in ﬁve major newspapers: the New York Times, the Wall Street
Journal, the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, and the Chicago
Tribune. We used the Lexis/Nexis and Factiva databases to search these
publications, and we excluded republished news, recurring pricing and
market data, obituaries, sports news, and calendars. We examined the
resulting list of stories by hand and deleted results that appeared to be
duplicates as well as stories fewer than 100 words long (mostly one-
paragraph teasers pointing to stories elsewhere in the paper). The second
count includes both these newspaper stories and stories found in Lexis/
Nexis transcripts of television news programs on three major broadcast
networks: ABC, CBS, and NBC.
27 There were 12,047 relevant newspaper
stories and 1,927 relevant television stories from October 16, 2001, to
December 31, 2003. The third and fourth counts exclude from the first
and second, respectively, all stories that do not include the word “401(k).”
170 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005
27. The transcripts were limited to national news programs (such as the CBS Evening
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into Enron’s collapse begins 
Sources: Washington Post, New York Times.
a. Figure is not drawn to scale. Share prices are adjusted for stock split.
Figure 4. Timeline of the Financial Collapses of Enron, WorldCom, 
and Global Crossing
aThis reduces the total number of stories to 761 for the newspapers-only
count and 905 for the television-plus-newspapers count. Table 3 provides a
breakdown of these totals by individual source. Our constructed variables
serve only as proxies for the millions of items on Enron, WorldCom, and
Global Crossing that appeared in local and national newspapers and maga-
zines and on websites, radio, and television.
Using these four news story counts, we created four geometrically
time-discounted news impact variables to capture the fact that reaction to
news does not occur immediately. The impact of each story is assumed to
decay by a factor δ for each day after its publication or broadcast. We
multiply the product by (1 −δ ) so that the mean value of the news impact
variables is invariant to the value of δ. Thus, for example, a story pub-
lished on January 2 would receive a weight of (1 −δ ) on that day, a
weight of δ(1 −δ ) on January 3, a weight of δ
2(1 −δ ) on January 4, and so
on. The impact of all stories on day t (where t = 0 on October 16, 2001) is
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Table 3. News Stories on Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossing, October 16, 2001,
to December 31, 2003
Stories mentioning 
All stories “401(k)” only
Days with Total story Days with Total story 
Medium stories count stories count
Newspapers
New York Times 639 3,134 125 184
Wall Street Journal 534 3,294 115 157
Washington Post 681 2,374 134 176
Los Angeles Times 712 2,567 112 133
Chicago Tribune 327 678 86 111
Television
ABC News 182 700 26 37
NBC News 163 459 37 55
CBS News 246 768 43 52
All newspapers 810 12,047 332 761
All television 322 1,927 79 144
All newspapers and television 810 13,974 344 905
Source: Lexis/Nexis and Factiva databases.where Np is the number of stories published on day p. Because we have
little theoretical or empirical guidance on the appropriate value of δ, we
try a range of values.
Figure 5 shows the number of relevant newspaper stories published on
each day, as well as the value of the news impact variable constructed
from those data using a value of δ=0.9. The most active news coverage
occurred from mid-December 2001 through the end of February 2002,
when Enron and Global Crossing ﬁled for bankruptcy. There is another
peak in June and July 2002, when WorldCom disclosed accounting irreg-
ularities and shortly thereafter ﬁled for bankruptcy.
Having created a proxy for media attention, we estimate its association
with 401(k) employer stockholding in two domains. First we study its
effect on aggregate 401(k) employer stockholding, using data on 401(k)
participants in a number of large ﬁrms. However, some of these employ-
ees may have been required to hold employer stock by their companies or
may not have had employer stock available as a 401(k) investment option.
Therefore we also analyze two speciﬁc companies that offered employer
















a  (0 = no impact)
2002:1 2002:2 2002:3 2002:4 2003:1 2001:4
Sources: Lexis/Nexis and Factiva and authors’ calculations.
a. Assumed news impact decay parameter δ = 0.9.
Figure 5. Newspaper Stories on Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossing and
Corresponding News Impact Variable, October 2001 to May 2003stock but had no diversification restrictions. We then examine whether
workers in Texas—and, even more speciﬁcally, Houstonians—reacted
more to the Enron bankruptcy than did workers outside of Texas. Because
Enron is headquartered in Houston, workers in Houston and Texas were ex-
posed to more Enron media coverage and were more likely to have known
people directly affected by the bankruptcy.
The Effect of News about Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossing 
on Aggregate Employer Stock Holdings
Our aggregate employer stock data come from the Hewitt 401(k) Index,
which measures daily trading activity in a large number of ﬁrms that col-
lectively employ 1.5 million participants with nearly $90 billion in 401(k)
assets.
28 Our Hewitt Index data run from August 4, 1997, through Novem-
ber 4, 2003 (seventy-ﬁve months). Because the set of ﬁrms represented in
the index changes over time, we restrict our attention to the subset that are
in the index for the entire sample period. These ﬁrms hold approximately
half the 401(k) assets of all ﬁrms in the index.
For these firms figure 6 shows both the fraction of total 401(k) assets
and the fraction of equities held in employer stock. The former ranges
from 26 to 38 percent, which is higher than the 19 percent calculated by
Holden and VanDerhei using a much larger database.
29 This discrepancy
probably results from the fact that firms in the Hewitt Index tend to be
very large, and large firms are more likely to offer employer stock as an
investment option. The fraction of equities in employer stock ranges from
36 to 51 percent over the same period.
The share of all assets in employer stock shows a declining trend from
August 1998 through March 2000, an increasing trend from March 2000
through May 2001, relative stability from May through November 2001,
and a declining trend from November 2001 through November 2003. The
beginning of that last declining trend coincides with the ﬁnancial collapse
of Enron. On October 15, 2001, the day before Enron’s shareholder equity
fell by $1.2 billion, the fraction of total balances in employer stock at
James J. Choi, David Laibson, and Brigitte C. Madrian 173
28. Hewitt Associates (undated-a, undated-b). Historical values for the index can be
found at was4.hewitt.com/hewitt/services/401k/index.htm. We do not use the index itself
but only certain inputs into the index.
29. Holden and VanDerhei (2001); VanDerhei (2002). They use the EBRI/ICI database
compiled by the Employee Beneﬁt Research Institute and the Investment Company Institute.Hewitt Index ﬁrms was 35.9 percent. By April 2003 it had reached a low
of 25.8 percent. However, a broader stock market decline began around
the same time, and this would have mechanically reduced the fraction of
401(k) assets held as employer stock even if employees were completely
passive.
If the decline in employer stock holdings were completely mechanically
driven by a general decline in stock prices, then employer stock as a fraction
of equities should not be greatly affected, because both the numerator and
the denominator in this fraction would decrease by roughly the same propor-
tion. Figure 6 shows, however, that this series is not ﬂat over the post-Enron
period, but the decline is much less pronounced than that for employer stock
as a fraction of all balances. Indeed, it is striking that employer stock as a
fraction of equity holdings barely moved during the time that the Enron
scandal was unfolding. However, this stable ratio need not be due to a lack of
trading in employer stock; plan participants could have aggressively sold
both employer stock and other equities. With such concerns in mind, we turn
to an analysis of trading activity in employer stock.
174 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005
Share of all balances
Share of equities
Percent






Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Hewitt Associates. 
a. Data are for only those firms that are in the Hewitt Index for the whole sample period.
Figure 6. Shares of Total 401(k) Balances Held in Employer Stock, 1997–2004
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30. Dollars traded includes only balances that are actively transferred from one invest-
ment option to another. It does not include payroll contributions that are invested in
employer stock, nor does it include withdrawals out of the plan entirely.
31. Occasionally, large changes in employer stock balances were observed because
data for certain component companies were missing on those days, generating outliers in
the calculated normalized trading activity. We eliminated such outlier days from our data.
Our dependent variable is the value of aggregate net transfers into or
out of employer stock, normalized by dividing by the preceding day’s
aggregate employer stock balance.
30 This variable will be positive when
the total dollars transferred into employer stock exceeds the total dollars
transferred out, and zero or negative otherwise. Figure 7 plots normalized
net transfers over our sample period.
31 Casual visual inspection indicates
that net trading volatility seems to have increased following Enron’s col-
lapse, but the mean direction of trade does not obviously shift.
To isolate the impact of the ﬁnancial collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and
Global Crossing on employer stock trading, we regressed normalized net









1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Percent of preceding day’s employer stock balance 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Hewitt Associates.
Figure 7. Daily Net Transfers of Employer Stock in 401(k)s, August 1997 to 
July 2003176 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005
32. The S&P return variables are the returns today, yesterday, last month, the last six
months, and the last one, two, three, and four years. The short-horizon return variables allow
us to control for transfers due to day traders.
33. Note that the coefﬁcients across regressions where the story counts differ are not
directly comparable, because the average magnitude of the news impact variable differs. The
economic magnitudes, not the coefﬁcients themselves, should be used to compare effects.
34. We also ran regressions including a post-Enron dummy variable to see if there was a
discrete drop in employer stock holdings once the Enron scandal broke. We did not ﬁnd any
statistically significant or economically large coefficients, and the coefficient signs often
indicated that the Enron scandal caused a small movement into employer stock.
market returns on the Standard and Poor’s 500 stock index (calculated so
that the returns are nonoverlapping),
32 day-of-the-week dummies, and a
cubic polynomial time trend (in annualized trading days). Table 4 reports
least-squares regression results using the four different versions of the
news impact variable and δ values of 0.25 and 0.9.
The coefficients on the news impact variable are negative and statisti-
cally significant across all specifications, indicating that trading out of
employer stock occurred in response to media attention to the Enron,
WorldCom, and Global Crossing episodes. We calculate the total media-
induced decline in employer stock holdings as a fraction of 401(k) bal-
ances using the formula
where β is the regression coefficient on the news impact variable, em-
ployer stock percentt−1 is the fraction of total balances held in employer
stock on day t − 1, and T − 1 is the total number of post-Enron trading days
in our sample. The last row of table 4 shows the calculated economic mag-
nitudes for each speciﬁcation.
33 No matter how we deﬁned a news story as
relevant, and regardless of the δ value chosen, none of the speciﬁcations
show that more than a 2.4-percentage-point drop in employer stock hold-
ings as a fraction of the total portfolio can be attributed to news about
Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossing.
34 The coefﬁcients become more
negative when all stories rather than just 401(k) stories are included, but
they attenuate when we broaden our media sources to include television.
There is no consistent pattern with respect to δ values. The small economic
magnitudes also hold in regressions (results not reported) that use other
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35. When lags of Np are included in the regression, only the preceding day’s lag is sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. As so often in empirical exercises, we cannot rule out the existence of
omitted variable bias, despite the robustness of our results to various speciﬁcations.
36. Hewitt Associates (2003).
37. Holden and VanDerhei (2001).
or stories about Enron only), that use other values of δ, that exclude the
trend variables, that use data aggregated to the monthly level, or that use a
distributed lag speciﬁcation for the impact of news rather than a geometri-
cally decaying speciﬁcation.
35
If a large fraction of Hewitt Index ﬁrms do not offer employer stock in
their 401(k), or if many employees in those ﬁrms are unable to diversify
because of holding restrictions, then the aggregate results in table 4 will sig-
niﬁcantly understate the true effect of media education on employer stock
holdings. Unfortunately, we do not know anything about the prevalence of
employer stock availability or holding restrictions among the companies in
the Hewitt Index. However, a 2003 Hewitt Associates survey that collected
data on various aspects of 401(k) plan design from approximately 450 large
ﬁrms reports that 49 percent of these ﬁrms offered employer stock as an
investment option.
36 Of those that offered employer stock, 78 percent either
had no diversiﬁcation restrictions for matching contributions directed into
employer stock or did not match in employer stock. If the Hewitt Index com-
panies are similar to this sample of ﬁrms, and if we assume counterfactually
that none of the employer stock reduction occurred in companies with hold-
ing restrictions, and if the speciﬁcation that yields the most negative news
impact coefﬁcient is correct, then the media coverage of Enron, WorldCom,
and Global Crossing caused employer stock holdings to drop by at most
2.35/0.49 × 0.78 = 6.15 percentage points in companies without holding re-
strictions, still a small effect. In reality, most employees at ﬁrms with hold-
ing restrictions are not constrained at the margin by the restrictions, because
they hold so much employer stock in the accounts over which they have full
discretion. Holden and VanDerhei report that employees with holding re-
quirements invest 33 percent of their own contributions in employer stock,
whereas employees without holding requirements invest 22 percent of their
entire 401(k) portfolio in employer stock.
37 Therefore 6.15 percentage points
is an upper bound on the true effect. The magnitude of this effect is consis-
tent with other estimates of ﬁnancial education we have reported elsewhere,180 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005
38. Choi and others (2002); Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2005a); Duﬂo and Saez (2003).
and with the ﬁnding by Esther Duﬂo and Emmanuel Saez that ﬁnancial edu-
cation motivates only small changes in 401(k) saving behavior.
38
The Effect of News on Companies Offering Employer Stock 
without Diversiﬁcation Restrictions
To further investigate the hypothesis that holding requirements pre-
vented a dramatic aggregate fall in employer stock holdings following
the Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossing scandals, we study two large
firms offering employer stock in their 401(k)s for which we have daily
trading data. The ﬁrst, company D, had employer stock holding require-
ments in the employer match account for most of the sample period (see
above). For this reason we examine only the employee contribution account
for company D, where there were no such restrictions. The second, com-
pany F, had no holding requirements anywhere in its 401(k) plan. In addi-
tion, employer matching contributions at company F were not directed
into employer stock; rather, their allocation mirrored that which employees
chose for their own contributions.
Figure 8 plots the fraction of employee contribution balances held in
employer stock from 1997 through 2003 for company D. Employer stock
holdings declined in the early post-Enron period (October 2001 through
January 2002) but increased for most of the period after that, including
the time of greatest Enron-related media attention (January through
March 2002). These patterns track the company’s stock price. Taken by
itself, this figure does not suggest that the employees of company D
responded to news about Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossing.
Figure 9 plots for company D the average fraction of employee contri-
bution ﬂows that went to employer stock on each date, with and without
weighting by dollar value. We examine these series because employees
who have decided to permanently decrease their employer stock holdings
may begin by stanching the ﬂow into employer stock that occurs at each
payroll date. In fact, the allocations steadily increased over time and show
only slight declines in the immediate wake of the Enron scandal before
continuing their march upward. There is thus little evidence of signiﬁcant
adjustment on the contribution ﬂow margin.James J. Choi, David Laibson, and Brigitte C. Madrian 181
39. We control for employer stock returns in excess of the S&P 500. Like Choi and
others (2004b), we find that positive excess employer stock returns cause trading out of
employer stock. We also add a dummy variable for the date when diversiﬁcation restric-
tions on the match account were lifted at the company.
Figure 10 plots daily net transfers of employer stock at company D as a
fraction of the previous day’s employer stock balance. We begin the sam-
ple in November 1997 because that is when the plan ﬁrst allowed trading
on a daily rather than a monthly basis. The magnitude of normalized net
trade ﬂows is larger than that observed in the Hewitt Index, but this is to be
expected. An individual company’s net trade ﬂow will have a substantial
idiosyncratic component, which will be averaged away when aggregated
with many other companies in the Hewitt Index.
Table 5 shows the results of regressing this series on the news impact
variable and several control variables, including those used in the previ-
ous subsection.
39 We ﬁnd that, across all speciﬁcations, the largest news-











Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Hewitt Associates.
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Figure 8. Share of Employee Contribution 401(k) Balances Held in Employer Stock












1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Hewitt Associates.
a. Aggregate employer stock balances in employer match accounts divided by aggregate employer match account balances.
Figure 9. Shares of Employee 401(k) Contributions Allocated to Employer Stock at
Company D, November 1997 to December 2003
1.21 percent of employee contribution balances.
40 When δ is set to 0.9, the
regression results suggest that news of the major bankruptcies caused
company D employees to trade into employer stock. Since we are study-
ing accounts with no diversification restrictions, we can conclude that
employees did not trade out of employer stock even in accounts in which
they had every opportunity to do so.
41
40. The coefﬁcients in this regression and in the company F regression below are not
directly comparable to those in the Hewitt Index regression, because the total economic
effect depends upon the initial fraction of the portfolio held in employer stock, which differs
across the three samples. The time trends should also not be expected to be similar across the
three sets of regressions, because of ﬁrm-speciﬁc trends that are averaged away in the aggre-
gate series.
41. The economic effect of one of the control variables in these regressions is anom-
alously large. The coefﬁcients on the linear time trend imply a 60-percentage-point drop in
employer stock holding due to the time trend. Since this would result in a negative average
employer stock position in the absence of other forces, we do not interpret this magnitude lit-
erally but consider it an artifact of a nonlinearity (see ﬁgure 8) that is not well ﬁt by a cubic






Percent of preceding day’s employer stock balance
1998 1999 2000 2003 2002 2001
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Hewitt Associates.
Figure 10. Daily Net Transfers of Employer Stock in 401(k)s at Company D,
November 1997 to March 2003
Figure 11 plots the fraction of total 401(k) account balances held in
employer stock over time at company F, which had no holding restrictions
on either the employee contribution or employer match balances. There are
two complications with the company F data. First, company F allows its
participants to put their 401(k) assets in a self-directed brokerage window,
where they can trade securities not offered in the company’s 401(k) invest-
ment menu. We do not observe daily balances in the self-directed window
and thus cannot include them in the daily total balances we calculate. (We
do, however, observe the self-directed window balances at the end of each
year.) Therefore ﬁgure 11 overstates the fraction of all 401(k) balances allo-
cated to employer stock. Because we observe total employer stock balances
each day, our trading regressions will not be affected by this data issue. Sec-
ond, our company F sample does not start until January 2002, which means
that we do not observe pre-Enron behavior at this company. Therefore our
estimates of the news effect at company F may be less reliable.
Figure 12 shows that, over the entire sample period, the fraction of con-






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Hewitt Associates.
a. Excludes balances held in self-directed brokerage accounts within the company’s plan.
2002:1 2002:2 2002:3 2002:4 2003:1 2003:2 2003:3
Figure 11. Share of Total 401(k) Balances Held in Employer Stock at Company F,
January 2002 to December 2003
a
slowly increased, even during the post-Enron period. This corresponds to
the pattern in ﬁgure 11, which showed an increasing share of balances held
in employer stock over time. As at company D, there is no evidence of
Enron-induced adjustment in the contribution ﬂow allocations.
Figure 13 plots company F’s daily net transfers of employer stock as a
fraction of the preceding day’s employer stock balance. Table 6 shows the
news impact regression results. In calculating the economic effect, we mod-
ify equation 1 to reﬂect the fact that we do not observe total 401(k) bal-
ances each day, but only at the end of each year. Our alternative formula is
where τ0 is January 1, 2002, and T0 is the number of trading days for
which we have transactions data for company F.
42 We ﬁnd that the largest
() 2








total year-end 2003 401 k balances s
,
42. We have data on employer stock balances for company F as of December 31, 2001,













Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Hewitt Associates.
a. Aggregate contribution flow allocated to employer stock divided by total aggregate contribution flows.
2002:1 2002:2 2002:3 2002:4 2003:1 2003:2 2003:3
Figure 12. Shares of Employee 401(k) Contributions Allocated to Employer Stock 
at Company F, January 2002 to December 2003
a
economic effect of media coverage across all the speciﬁcations is a statis-
tically insigniﬁcant 5.2-percentage-point decrease. The average estimate
is a 1.8-percentage point-decrease.
Overall, our analysis of employer stock trading at companies D and F
shows no statistically or economically significant effect of the Enron,
WorldCom, and Global Crossing debacles on employees’ willingness
to hold employer stock, even in accounts not subject to diversification
restrictions.
Impact on Texas Employees Versus Non-Texas Employees
The Enron scandal is more likely to have been salient to workers liv-
ing in Texas than those living outside Texas. Not only was local news
coverage likely to have been more active, but residents of Texas are more
likely to have known Enron employees or friends of Enron employees.
About a quarter of Enron’s employees worked at the Houston headquar-
ters, and more than half of the company’s 8,000 job cuts in 2002 were in
Houston. Here we explore whether Texan employees at companies C188 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005
and G reduced their employer stock holdings more than did non-Texan
employees at the same companies.
Companies C and G are large retail ﬁrms chosen for this study because
they have a substantial number of employees both in and outside of Texas.
Company G imposed no diversification restrictions on its employees,
although employer matching contributions had to be initially invested in
employer stock. Employees who wished to diversify had to initiate a trade
periodically, but they were free to do so at any time. We do not have daily
transactions data for company G, and so we rely on a different identiﬁca-
tion strategy than in the previous subsection. We have cross-sectional
snapshots of portfolio allocations at the end of each year from 1998 to
2002. We use these snapshots, exploiting the fact that employees rarely
change their 401(k) elections after enrolling.
43 Therefore any year-end dif-
ferences in employer stock holdings between Texans and non-Texans who






Percent of preceding day’s employer stock balance
2002:1 2002:2 2002:3 2002:4 2003:1 2003:2 2003:3 2003:4
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Hewitt Associates.
Figure 13. Daily Net Transfers of Employer Stock in 401(k)s at Company F, 
January 2002 to January 2004


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.made at the time of enrollment. We investigate whether Texans who
enrolled in the post-Enron period show an increasing tendency to deviate
from non-Texans’ employer stock allocations.
Figure 14 graphs the fraction of total balances held in employer stock
against enrollment date for three groups of employees at company G: those
living in the greater Houston metropolitan area (Harris County), those liv-
ing outside of greater Houston but in Texas, and those living outside of
Texas. The portfolio allocation is taken from the ﬁrst year-end snapshot
after the employee’s enrollment date. This figure shows that the asset
allocations of all three groups track each other fairly closely. There is no
greater tendency for either Houstonians or Texans to reduce their employer
stock holdings in the wake of the Enron scandal.
Company C imposes age- and tenure-based diversiﬁcation constraints
on its employees as described previously. Therefore we examine employer
stock holdings in only those accounts over which the employees have full
discretion, employing the same identiﬁcation method as for company G.
Figure 15 plots the discretionary holdings in employer stock against initial














Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Hewitt Associates.
a. Allocations are measured at the end of the year in which the participant enrolled.
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Figure 14. Shares of 401(k) Balances Held in Employer Stock by New Plan
Participants at Company G, by Initial Participation Date and Location, 
January 1998 to January 2003
aenrollment date. As in ﬁgure 14, the allocation is measured at the ﬁrst year-
end snapshot after enrollment. As with company G, there is no signiﬁcant
reduction in the employer stock holdings of Texan employees relative to
non-Texans. There are not enough Houston-based employees at company
C to analyze them separately.
The evidence presented here does not seem to support the hypothesis
that proximity to ﬁnancial disaster leads to wiser decisions about employer
stock.
Conclusions
Our analysis suggests that empowering employees to trade out of em-
ployer stock and educating them about the risks of employer stock will have
only a small effect on 401(k) employer stock holdings. Even after diver-
siﬁcation restrictions were relaxed at five companies, it was typical for
over 90 percent of employer match balances to remain in employer stock.
Two years of headlines about decimated 401(k) accounts in the early part of









Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Hewitt Associates.
a. Allocations are measured at the end of the year in which the participant enrolled.
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Figure 15. Shares of New Employee 401(k) Contributions Allocated to Employer
Stock at Company C, by Initial Participation Date and Location, January 1998 to
January 2003
athis decade did little to drive investors out of their employer’s stock. Our
estimates suggest that the media publicity surrounding the Enron, World-
Com, and Global Crossing bankruptcies reduced the fraction of aggregate
401(k) assets held in employer stock by at most 2 percentage points, from
about 36 percent to about 34 percent. These results support the conclusions
of earlier studies that consumers are often passive,
44 and that educational
interventions yield remarkably small changes in saving behavior.
45
These conclusions pose a problem for policy, because education and
empowerment are the key components of almost all of the proposals for
401(k) employer stock reform listed in appendix table A-1 (for example,
bills S.9, S. 1992, S. 2032, and S. 2190). None of these legislative proposals
are nearly as stringent as those currently applied to deﬁned-beneﬁt plans,
which cap employer stock holdings at 10 percent of account balances.
The persistent appeal of employer stock leaves economists in a policy-
making quandary. On the one hand, the well-known benefits of diversifi-
cation argue that employer stock should not make up a large fraction of a
worker’s retirement portfolio. On the other hand, economists dislike
paternalism and do not want to enact coercive policies such as banning
employer stock in retirement accounts. More generally, household saving
decisions are fraught with other economically signiﬁcant mistakes, which
only the most paternalistic would consider forbidding.
46
Fortunately, some reasonable policy options are available that are likely
to reduce employer stock holdings without denying investors freedom
of choice.
47 Under today’s status quo, many ﬁrms invest matching contri-
butions in employer stock. The natural experiments reported in this paper
show that such matching contributions tend to stick where they initially
land, regardless of any subsequent diversification opportunities. Hence
employer stock holdings would be signiﬁcantly reduced if the default asset
allocation for employer matching contributions were changed to provide
greater diversification. For example, default portfolios could be required
to meet the same fiduciary standards that apply to defined-benefit pen-
sion plans.
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44. Madrian and Shea (2001); Choi and others (2002).
45. Duflo and Saez (2003); Choi and others (2002); Choi, Laibson, and Madrian
(2005a).
46. See Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2005a).
47. See Sunstein and Thaler (forthcoming) for a general discussion of noncoercive pre-
scriptive policies, which they call “libertarian paternalism.”With diversified defaults, investor inertia would be rendered harm-
less, because only those investors who actively opt out of the default
could pile into employer stock. As noted above, in 401(k) plans that offer
employer stock as an investment option but lack an employer stock default
for matching funds, only 22 percent of balances end up in employer stock.
By contrast, in 401(k) plans with an employer stock default for matching
funds, well over 50 percent of balances end up in employer stock.
48
Strict libertarians may object even to restrictions on default portfolios.
If requiring diversified defaults is deemed too paternalistic, employees
could be asked to explicitly choose their own asset allocation instead of
being defaulted into an undiversified allocation.
49 Alternatively, legisla-
tion could remove the perverse tax benefits that give firms an incentive
to choose employer stock as a default asset allocation.
50
The common theme is that defaults stick and bad defaults are not
inevitable. Bad defaults could be replaced with either good (diversified)
defaults or with default-free choice. Banning bad defaults does not coerce
employees, since they are free to opt out of a good default and adopt any
asset allocation they choose. However, banning bad defaults does coerce
ﬁrms, since they are no longer free to use defaults to induce their employ-
ees to become shareholders. Although we see this as a good thing for
employees, there are some potential countervailing effects, such as a
potential decline in the willingness of firms to provide a 401(k) match,
or, in the extreme, to offer a savings plan at all.
Requiring (or at least encouraging) good defaults is a plausible solution
to many weaknesses in the nation’s retirement savings system. Defaults
can be used to encourage participation in retirement plans, raise retirement
saving rates among at-risk groups, and diversify 401(k) portfolios. In
every case, defaults need not be coercive to work. However, defaults are a
two-edged sword, since poorly chosen defaults can wreak havoc on ﬁnan-
cially unsophisticated, inertia-bound consumers.
194 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005
48. Although employees in these plans are required to hold a signiﬁcant fraction of this
employer stock, the evidence in this paper and in others shows that these requirements are
not binding at the margin for most employees, since voluntary employer stockholding is so
high in these plans.
49. Choi and others (2005).
50. However, some perverse incentives would not be easy to remove. For example,




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































William G. Gale: This paper by James Choi, David Laibson, and Brigitte
Madrian documents the well-known fact that many workers invest a signif-
icant share of their 401(k) contributions in the equity of their own employer,
and brieﬂy reviews the literature indicating that that share is too large. The
basic argument here is correct. Asset returns on a well-diversified equity
and bond portfolio will have a smaller variance than those on a concen-
trated equity portfolio. And, of course, holding employer stock increases
the correlation between a worker’s labor market and ﬁnancial market out-
comes, which is not likely to be a good thing.
The paper also documents that workers do not diversify away from
employer stock when given the chance to, and even when bombarded with
news stories illustrating the problems of holding employer stock. The evi-
dence is compelling. Although the authors spend a lot of effort “proving”
this result with a variety of regressions, readers should not come away think-
ing that the result is somehow sensitive to the speciﬁcation. Figure 6 in
the paper shows the stability of employer stock holdings over the relevant
sample period. Although some variation is evident, the authors point out that
the more relevant of the two series, employer stock as a share of equities in
401(k)s, varies relatively little. Moreover, the variation is especially small
given that the optimal level for this series should be very close to zero.
Having bought into the basic ﬁndings, I will turn to two related points
that may provide some perspective on the issues the authors address.
1 The
ﬁrst is that the current set of rules governing how workers may invest their
401(k) balances is essentially an accident of history. The 401(k) has come
1. Much of the rest of this comment is based on Gale and Iwry (2005).200 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005
to play a far more central and critical role in the pension system than was
envisioned when it was created in the late 1970s, yet the rules have changed
little since then.
Twenty-ﬁve years ago, deﬁned-beneﬁt plans (together with certain
types of traditional deﬁned-contribution pension plans, such as employer-
funded proﬁt-sharing plans and money purchase plans) were workers’ pri-
mary source of private pension coverage. These plans require workers to
make almost no important ﬁnancial choices before retirement. The ﬁrm
enrolls all eligible workers, makes contributions on their behalf, and
makes all the investment decisions or retains professional investment man-
agers to do so. The worker’s only real choices are when and in what form
to collect beneﬁts.
When 401(k) plans began their rapid spread in the early 1980s, they were
viewed mainly as supplements to these traditional employer-funded plans.
Since 401(k) participants were presumed to have their basic retirement
income security needs covered by a traditional employer-funded plan and
Social Security, they were given substantial discretion over their 401(k)
choices, including whether to participate, how much to contribute, how to
invest, and when and in what form to withdraw the funds.
Over the past twenty-five years, however, the pension landscape has
changed dramatically. Many workers covered by an employer plan now
have a 401(k) as their primary or only plan. Yet 401(k)s still operate in much
the same way as in the early 1980s. Workers must still, for the most part,
decide for themselves whether and how much to contribute, how to invest,
and how and when to withdraw the funds. Imposing on workers the res-
ponsibility to make these choices may have been relatively harmless when
401(k)s were smaller, supplemental plans with limited coverage. The risk
of workers making poor investment choices looms much larger now that
401(k)s have become the primary pension vehicle.
The second point is that government policies have encouraged this situ-
ation in several ways. As 401(k)s have expanded over the last twenty-ﬁve
years, Congress has been enacting rules that implicitly or explicitly encour-
age overinvestment in company stock. First, the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) relieved employers of most ﬁduciary
responsibility for investment losses if they allowed employees to direct their
own investments—this was likely one factor encouraging the shift to 401(k)s.
Second, the main exception to the pervasive use of employee-directed
investment in 401(k)s has been plan sponsors’ frequent decision to makeJames J. Choi, David Laibson, and Brigitte C. Madrian 201
their contributions to these accounts in the form of employer stock. Although
this tendency undermines diversiﬁcation and might normally be considered
a conﬂict of interest, Congress actually granted special exceptions from the
normal ﬁduciary standards to allow employer (and employee) contributions
to be heavily invested in employer stock. Third, there are tax subsidies that
favor employee holding of employer stock.
Meanwhile the rationales originally articulated for providing special
exceptions for employer stock are very weak. One rationale was to encour-
age worker ownership of equities, but this has already been addressed by
the availability of diversiﬁed equity investments through 401(k)s. A second
rationale was to encourage higher productivity through increased worker
ownership. The introduction of 401(k)s probably has not had much of a
productivity effect, however. A third rationale was that the ability to
donate employer stock encourages ﬁrms both to offer 401(k) plans and to
offer matching contributions. (This becomes an issue particularly during
hard times and for privately held companies.) This concern may well be
overstated, especially if the tax subsidies are removed, but even if it is not
overstated, it can probably be dealt with through other policy options.
Although the authors discuss policy options, let me mention some
distinctions that I think are crucial. For example, no one is considering
banning workers from holding employer stock outside of their 401(k) or
banning ﬁrms from offering employer stock as a form of compensation.
The issue is how much, if any, employer stock holding should occur within
401(k) plans. Because 401(k)s are subsidized, this is a legitimate question,
especially since other prohibitions exist for 401(k) investments. In addition,
policy for employer stock holding in 401(k)s ought to distinguish between
ﬁrms that also offer a deﬁned-beneﬁt plan and ﬁrms that do not, and between
ﬁrms issuing stock to 401(k) participants as part of the company match and
employees using their 401(k) balances to buy employer stock on their own.
In fact, most employee holdings of employer stock in 401(k)s are there by
the employees’ choice, not from employer contributions. Lastly, at the very
least policy rules should be neutral toward employer stock holding rather
than actually encourage it.
Given these considerations, a number of promising options exist. Con-
gress could give a ﬁduciary safe harbor to plan ﬁduciaries that follow a
systematic employer stock divestiture program. This would facilitate divesti-
ture by plan sponsors that recognize they might have gotten in too deep
but are still hesitant to divest themselves of the company stock. Employers202 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005
fear litigation for ﬁduciary breach if their plans sell company stock or sell it
too quickly (in the event the stock’s value subsequently rises) or too slowly
(in the event it falls). A safe harbor “glide path” for systematic, gradual
diversification would also help address employers’ other legitimate con-
cerns: that large sales of company stock from the plan might depress the
market for the stock or, more commonly, that the market or employees
might perceive such sales as a signal that management lacks conﬁdence in
the company’s future.
An alternative is the “Sell More Tomorrow” plan proposed by Richard
Thaler and Shlomo Benartzi.
2 They suggest that plan sponsors offer employ-
ees the option of participating in a systematic program of gradual employer
stock divestiture over a period of years. Consistent with the employer-level
safe harbor “glide path” approach suggested just above, Thaler and Benartzi
advocate this creative, employee-level approach as a way to encourage
employees to take a possibly difﬁcult step by arranging to do most of it in
the future. By spreading out the sale of the shares over time, this approach
also avoids potentially depressing the market for the stock and mitigates
any risk of employee remorse for having sold at the wrong time.
Another possible approach would be to permit employees to invest their
own contributions in employer stock only to the extent their total contri-
butions in a given year exceed some threshold. Such a threshold could be set,
for example, at 7 percent of pay—a level slightly above the actual average
401(k) contribution rate—or it could be based on whether the ﬁrm also
has a deﬁned-beneﬁt plan. Any of these options would be preferable to the
current set of rules.
Nellie Liang:
1 This paper by Choi, Laibson, and Madrian empirically
examines two very important issues, empowerment and education, in the
context of how employees manage their company stock holdings in their
401(k) accounts; it also presents some policy recommendations. The
authors ﬁrst take a close look at empowerment by documenting how
employees react when diversiﬁcation constraints on such holdings are
relaxed. They consider data from each of several companies (each with its
own variant on these constraints), sketch out the maximum diversiﬁcation
2. Benartzi and Thaler (2002).
1. The opinions expressed here are mine and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Board.allowed, and compare that with what an average or typical participant does.
They ﬁnd that participants diversify to only a very modest degree and retain
what appears to be too much company stock from the perspective of a
mean-variance efﬁcient portfolio. The authors use this evidence to argue
that legislation that simply relaxes diversiﬁcation constraints will do little
to help the current situation.
The authors’ evidence on the effect of education comes from looking at
net transfers of company stock and whether it responds to news about other
companies whose employees suffered from holding too much or even any
company stock. The authors create indexes of the quantity of news about
Enron, Global Crossing, and WorldCom and use these as independent vari-
ables in regressions explaining net transfers of company stock, ﬁrst for a
constant sample of companies in the Hewitt index, and then for two com-
panies for which they have individual participant data. They ﬁnd only
modest effects of the news index on net transfers, and they interpret this as
evidence that ﬁnancial education is ineffective. They argue that employees
would be better off if policies were established to encourage ﬁrms to set
“proper” (more diversiﬁed) defaults.
To sum up, the authors start from the premise that ﬁrms understand how
employees behave and that they exploit that behavior to promote company
stock; the authors then argue that employees do not understand basic
diversiﬁcation principles and that there is no hope that they will learn.
Although I am sympathetic to many of the authors’ conclusions, my com-
ments will elaborate on how the cost of company stock should be evalu-
ated and will question whether the authors’ news index is a true measure
of education. In the end, however, my policy recommendations will not
differ all that much from theirs.
My first set of comments relates to the empowerment evidence and
whether employees’ behavior is as irrational as it seems. To understand asset
holdings, one needs to recognize that the very large share of assets held in
company stock can be explained largely by the employer match policy and
that employees rarely make changes to these holdings once contributions
are invested. This part of the discussion draws on a recent paper that I
co-wrote that discusses the costs and benefits to firms of providing the
employer matching contribution in company stock.
2 Analyzing roughly
3,200 ﬁrm-year observations, our paper ﬁnds that if the employer match is
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not made in company stock, employees will voluntarily invest on average
about 16 percent of their own contributions in company stock. A share of
that size is not by itself likely to warrant legislation to encourage greater
diversification. However, if the employer match is in company stock,
employees will invest even more, about 25 percent on average, of their own
contributions into company stock; this additional 9 percentage points has
been attributed to employees viewing the employer match in company stock
as an implicit endorsement of company stock as an investment.
3 This higher
share combined with the employer match leads to a very high 46 percent
of total contributions being invested in company stock each year at ﬁrms
that match in company stock, a share that would seem to violate all notions
of what constitutes an efﬁcient diversiﬁcation strategy. Moreover, asset
holdings of company stock, at 42 percent of the total, are a strong indication
that contributions once made tend to stick in the asset category in which
they are initially invested.
Why do ﬁrms like to have employees hold company stock in their 401(k)
plans? One reason is that company stock is less expensive to offer than
other options, because there are no fees to pay to an asset manager or even to
an index fund. In addition, company stock promotes employee ownership,
which may raise employee morale and productivity. The cross-sectional
empirical evidence suggests that ﬁrms also may like company stock because
it can reduce their tax bill if they pay dividends. More important, by putting
company stock in “friendly hands,” employee holdings of company stock
can operate as an antitakeover mechanism.
4 Interestingly, we found no evi-
dence that, among ﬁrms that offer an employer match, lack of earnings or
cash ﬂow increased the likelihood that a match would be made in company
stock. In fact, we found almost an opposite result: ﬁrms with lower bank-
ruptcy risk and lower stock price volatility were more likely to match with
company stock. Thus it is not the case that the riskiest ﬁrms are pushing
their stock onto their employees.
For their part, employees might like to hold company stock for a number
of reasons, some of which might not be considered rational from an efﬁcient
mean-variance portfolio perspective. The hypothesis that employees hold
company stock out of loyalty to their company has found some empirical
3. Benartzi (2001); Liang and Weisbenner (2002).
4. See also Rauh (forthcoming).James J. Choi, David Laibson, and Brigitte C. Madrian 205
support,5 and a perception that company stock is less risky than other indi-
vidual stocks is supported by survey responses. But we know that the latter
view cannot be right, and in our paper we conﬁrm, using simulations based
on historical asset returns, that it is costly for employees to have a large share
of their 401(k) assets in company stock rather than in a diversiﬁed equity
fund: placing the employers’ matching contribution in a diversiﬁed equity
fund rather than company stock results in greater wealth upon retirement
81 percent of the time. Most risk-averse employees would therefore surely
prefer the portfolio with the match in diversiﬁed equities.
However, as noted, ﬁrms do have some incentives to match with com-
pany stock, whereas they have no incentive, and maybe some risk arising
from ERISA, to match with diversified equities. So the more relevant
comparison to evaluate is whether retirement wealth is greater when the
employer match is made in company stock, or when the match is unrestricted
and employees are given discretion over how to invest the match dollars.
Simulation results for these two scenarios suggest that many employees
would prefer the 401(k) portfolio at a firm that matches with company
stock over an otherwise equivalent portfolio at a ﬁrm with an unrestricted
match. Why would this result arise? An important reason is that employees
left to make their own choices might not invest efﬁciently, but instead might
put the entire match into a single other asset or invest using a 1/n diversi-
ﬁcation rule, as has been found in a number of studies.
6 In our simulations,
a 1/n rule would lead to about half the contributions being invested in ﬁxed-
income securities and half in equities (including company stock). In this
comparison many employees would have been better off with the com-
pany stock match portfolio, because the greater proportion of equities
from the company stock match would generate more expected wealth,
although also more risk, given the historical equity premium. Another rea-
son is that, as already noted, ﬁrms that match in company stock have less
volatile stock prices and are less likely to go bankrupt than firms with an
unrestricted match. As noted above, however, many employees would
still be better off with a diversiﬁed equity fund.
5. Cohen (2005).
6. Benartzi and Thaler (2001); Liang and Weisbenner (2002); Huberman and Jiang
(2004). Huberman and Jiang ﬁnd that, among participants who invested in ﬁve or fewer
options, 1/n (that is, an equal division of assets across all available types of asset) approxi-
mated behavior for a large fraction.206 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005
What this comparison illustrates is that policies designed to restrict
employer matches in company stock will be more of a constraint for less
risky ﬁrms, which would reduce the potential beneﬁts of the restriction.
More important, it illustrates that very careful consideration should be given
to how employees might invest the employer match if matching in com-
pany stock were restricted.
Finally, one beneﬁt of holding company stock in a 401(k) plan has not
received a lot of attention but seems potentially important. According to the
net unrealized appreciation rule that applies to company stock in 401(k)
plans, the gains on company stock can be taxed at the capital gains rate,
whereas gains on other assets (such as a diversiﬁed equity fund) are taxed at
the higher, ordinary income tax rate. When this rule applies, only the cost
basis of the company stock match would be taxed at the income tax rate.
Although there are restrictions on when this favorable treatment would
apply, this beneﬁt can be considerable for employees in high income tax
brackets who have company stock that has appreciated considerably.
If the authors’ dataset includes participant characteristics that could proxy
for their tax status, it would be interesting to look at whether this tax ben-
eﬁt is an important explanation for why employees do not diversify out of
company stock as they approach retirement. One could then test whether
employees close to retirement age are more likely to hold large amounts
of company stock if they are in a high tax bracket and have enjoyed a sub-
stantial stock price appreciation.
What are the effects of ﬁnancial education on employees’ investment
decisions? Currently, there is not much clear evidence indicating that such
education leads to better ﬁnancial choices. Many empirical studies that do
ﬁnd such an effect seem subject to the criticism that those participants will-
ing to invest in ﬁnancial education may well be those most willing to make
portfolio changes in the ﬁrst place, lending an upward bias to any measured
effects. But the test in this paper is hard to interpret. The news index the
authors construct may not really be a measure of education about company
stock or about the beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation, and in any case their speciﬁca-
tion may not permit any effects of such education to show through.
The authors’ index quantiﬁes the number of news articles related to three
companies that failed spectacularly because of massive fraud. The idea is
that such news could educate employees of other companies by showing
them real-world examples of how holding too much 401(k) wealth in
company stock can lead to substantial losses. However, it is likely thatJames J. Choi, David Laibson, and Brigitte C. Madrian 207
employees already understand that their own ﬁrm could conceivably fail
and that the value of their company stock could fall to zero. More impor-
tant, it is not clear whether more information about these three companies,
which may not be perceived as typical, would change employees’ views
about the risk of owning stock in their own employer. Therefore it is not
clear whether one should interpret this variable as ﬁnancial education and
expect to observe an effect.
In fact, one might be comforted by the result that news about these out-
liers does not lead investors to change their views about the distribution of
their own possible wealth outcomes. To illustrate, suppose that the authors
had instead created a news index of three companies with dramatic stock
price gains, such as Yahoo, Amazon, and eBay, and found that news of
wealth creation at these three companies led employees at other companies
to purchase more of their own company stock for their 401(k)s. I do not think
most economists would be sanguine about such results. Instead, one could
interpret the small effect that the authors ﬁnd as evidence that employees
realize that these ﬁrms were outliers and that these incidents did not convey
to them new information about the risk of their own company.
It is also possible that the lack of strong evidence between net transfers
and this news measure reﬂects a measurement problem. In particular, given
the lack of attention and energy that employees apply to managing their
accounts, it does not seem reasonable to look at net transfers at a daily fre-
quency; it might also be the case that the news does not generate an imme-
diate effect, but rather that the effect builds over time (instead of decaying as
the authors assume). Hewitt Associates reports that only one in six accounts
had any kind of transfer in 2002, and the same in 2003. If employees are slow
to implement their portfolio changes, if any, daily intervals for examining
transfers might be too short.
Finally, if the data are available, a valuable addition to the paper would be
an exploration of why, according to Hewitt Associates, the share of aggre-
gate 401(k) assets in company stock has fallen. It does not appear that net
transfers can explain the 10-percentage-point decline in the share of assets
in company stock from the end of 2001 to mid-2003. Perhaps employees
responded to the news about Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossing by
redirecting new contributions away from company stock rather than by
transferring assets. Or perhaps employers responded to employees’ demands
to change the employer match from company stock to an unrestricted match.
The latter alternative strikes me as a very likely explanation.208 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005
Let me conclude by discussing some of the policy implications of the
authors’ ﬁndings. First, I would agree that serious consideration should be
given to limiting the employer match in company stock. Such matching is a
primary reason why so much company stock is held in 401(k) portfolios.
But consideration should be given to the fact that it is the less risky ﬁrms
that are more likely to match in company stock, and that it is not always the
case that what participants would do on their own will yield a better out-
come. It is not difﬁcult to demonstrate that there are inferior alternatives to
an employer match provided in company stock. Policies should be designed
to reduce a ﬁrm’s potential liability associated with advising employees
about how to invest the employer match. Second, I would not interpret
these ﬁndings as showing the futility of ﬁnancial education. I do not know
whether the authors’ index is really a measure of education, or if their
choice of time intervals for their estimations biases against ﬁnding a result.
Moreover, I do not think the appropriate message is to give up on education.
Instead, more emphasis should be placed on ﬁnding ways to make it work
better. Finally, an easy prescription is to eliminate certain tax preferences,
especially the one that permits individuals to pay the lower capital gains
rate on the appreciation of company stock but not on that of other equities.
This preference seems especially costly because it promotes the retention of
large company stock holdings right before retirement.
General discussion: Gregory Mankiw said he was uncomfortable with the
general approach to policy analysis embodied in the literature to which this
paper contributed. In Mankiw’s view this approach consisted of observ-
ing behavior that appears inconsistent with economists’ models of rational
decisionmaking and then recommending policy changes to encourage agents
to behave more like the models. It implicitly assumes that economists are
smarter or know more than the agents making the decisions. What this lit-
erature does not adequately address is why ﬁrms and employees behave the
way they do. Although the paper mentions several possible reasons—the
special tax treatment of gains on company stock, the use of 401(k) plans as
an antitakeover mechanism, employee loyalty to the ﬁrm—until economists
understand why some companies encourage or require their employees to
hold company stock, it is hard to conclude that a remedy is needed.
Alan Blinder took the opposite view, suggesting that the discussion had
given insufﬁcient respect to paternalism. No one with even the slightest
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wealth in employer stock. Blinder cited Nellie Liang’s ﬁnding that people
believe it is less risky to invest in their own company’s stock than in an S&P
500 index fund. This shows that people do not understand the importance
of the high correlation between returns on their most valuable asset—their
human capital—and returns on their own company’s stock. He cited the
success of the ﬂypaper theory of portfolio allocation—that money tends to
stick wherever it lands—as further evidence of irrational investor behavior.
Blinder argued that picking a sensible default portfolio allocation would
almost certainly improve the risk-adjusted investment returns of those
employees who tend to stick with what they are initially given, yet would
not constrain the options of employees who believe they have a good reason
for choosing some other allocation.
Francesco Giavazzi noted that the paper’s results were in line with those
of a recent experiment in Italy: Italian companies are required to con-
tribute between 8 and 10 percent of each employee’s take-home pay to an
employee retirement account, from which the worker can withdraw only
upon leaving the company. Until recently these accounts were, in effect, a
corporate bond that pays a below-market interest rate but, in the case of
bankruptcy, were senior to any other company liability. Because job turn-
over in Italy is low, the accumulated sum amounts, on average, to two years
of wages upon termination of employment. A couple of years ago, however,
the government lifted the restriction on how contributions could be invested,
yet a negligible proportion of employees chose to reallocate their portfolios.
Of course, this behavior could also be interpreted as evidence of extreme
risk aversion, with workers being attracted by the seniority of their claim
on the company in the traditional arrangement.
Robert Gordon drew parallels between the collapse of Enron and the other
companies studied and the airline industry after the September 11 attacks.
United Airlines, for example, had established an employee stock option
plan (ESOP) in 1994, when employees accepted substantial wage cuts in
return for company stock, without the option of diversiﬁcation. This other-
wise admirably conceived plan failed after September 11, and the employees
lost everything. Gordon also noted that the pension strategies followed by
the successful younger airlines, particularly Southwest and JetBlue, are, if
anything, likely to have increased the vulnerability of their employees to
company failure. The older airlines had created deﬁned-beneﬁt pension
plans subject to ERISA, whereas the newer airlines provide pension beneﬁts
through proﬁt-sharing plans, through which they give their own companystock to employees, much as in an ESOP. Although nothing prevents these
employees from reallocating their portfolios, the results presented by the
authors suggest that they, too, are likely to be heavily invested in the risky
stock of their own companies.
Hyun Shin observed that the fraction of employer stock in total 401(k)
balances is the mirror image of the fraction of those same stocks in major
stock indexes over the period. This suggests that a substantial portion of
company stocks held in 401(k)s are low-risk stocks like GE. William
Brainard found the ﬁgures in the paper persuasive and consistent with his
priors that the failures of Enron and the like would have had little effect
on employees’ investment decisions. But he also thought the failure of
news about these events to explain daily data on employee stock transfers
would not be surprising even if employees’ behavior had been affected.
Most employees appear to make decisions about portfolio allocations
infrequently: Liang had reported that only one in six accounts had any
transfer activity at all in 2002. If individuals did change their allocations
in response to news, it would be hard to see in daily data and would likely
reﬂect views acquired over a much longer period than that captured by the
authors’ short-run news measure.
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